Showing posts with label absolutism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label absolutism. Show all posts

Sunday, October 7, 2012

Descartes’ sadly misunderstood conundrum.

Blind leading the blind...


Jonnie Comet
22 April 2001

  If I were to tell you that all your life experience is not really as you have perceived it at all, but that you are actually a guinea-pig taking a test in a clinic in which we have sealed you in a virtual-reality dome and provided you with every sensation you’ve ever perceived, could you prove me wrong? 
  The answer will depend on how you determine reality.  Do you rely upon senses or thinking?
 
  Rene Descartes and the other absolutists of his time accepted the axiom that the cardinal nature of Man is to reason.  The faculty of Reason is, after all, what sets Man apart from lesser beasts.  This is all well, especially when we read or hear Descartes’ oft-repeated adage, ‘I think; therefore I am’.  It is so easy to assume that this idea proposes that since we can think, or reason, we can determine reality.  But in this modern and relevance-related world Descartes’ statement is highly misunderstood.  Too many people, throughout all ages, but especially now, tend to equate what they perceive with what is true.  These are the same people who will claim that any opinion is valid, and then rely so heavily upon their own assessments of people and issues and events that they unknowingly erect a smoke-screen of subjective ‘data’ entirely irrespective of the real facts.  Sadly these people will be the last to ever accept that their own application of reason may be inherently flawed. 
  
  When Descartes says, ‘I think; therefore I am’, he does not mean, as the typical modern American relativist may claim, that perception determines reality.  Subscribing to this misconception, it is all too easy to indulge the common logical fallacy of assuming, ‘Since I think such-and-such about this, it must therefore be true’.  For example, if an individual feels cold, he may believe that in fact it is cold– meaning that the ambient temperature is less than it usually is– in spite of the equal likelihood that he may simply have a fever and be unaware that his temperature-sensing ability is compromised, and thus his awareness about the weather today.  To debate this with him– hopefully without agitating his illness! –will result in his frustrated declaration of ‘Well it’s cold to me!  What else is there?’ 
  
  The first thing our misguided, suffering friend must realise is that the philosophical axiom ‘I think; therefore I am’ is an absolutist one to start with.  And it does not defend any reliance on personal relevance at all but does quite the opposite.  It condemns the concept of a subjective reality, suggesting instead that there is only one thing anyone can be sure of: that he can be sure that is the only thing he can be sure of.  In other words, I know I am thinking, since to merely question whether or not I am thinking already proves that I am thinking.  And Descartes’ point is that since that is entirely internal, as if conceived in a vacuum, not affected by outside circumstances, it can be considered logically pure, and therefore can be accepted as true by virtue of being purely reasonable.  It is only when I begin to involve perceptions of outside circumstances in my thought processes that the determination of what is or is not true becomes problematic.  
 
  Truth may or may not be hid from an individual, but surely he will not be able to tell it by his physical senses, nor sometimes even by his intellectual ones.  Though Jefferson has it that truths will be self-evident, by definition easily perceived as true, it does not automatically imply the reverse, that the obvious must therefore be true.  For example, I might perceive that the sky is pink, since all round I see pink; but I may not know whether or not I am wearing pink glasses.  If it is true that I am wearing pink glasses, it fundamentally alters the validity of my claim that the sky is in fact pink.  If in fact I am not wearing those glasses, then perhaps the sky is pink after all; but notice that it all depends on my awareness of some greater reality which may have been kept from me, without my knowledge that such a fact could even be possible.  Therefore any claim to reality I might make before I fully investigate the existence and status of all the truth is therefore incomplete and probably invalid.  The truly logical thinker will allow for the possibility that he may not know all the facts, but allow too that absolute truth does exist, however it may be beyond his perception for the moment or for ever.  
  
  Now this may seem like an inane argument, because how often might it be that I would be wearing pink glasses?  But take it a step further and consider how such a misunderstanding can influence larger issues.  The archetypical misapplication of the Descartes idea is for one to use a personally-perceived relevance as proof of a universal truth.  A relativist politician may feel that a certain plan for economy seems risky, but he measures risk by how it would affect his own personal finances and so votes against it, claiming that it is truly bad even though millions of others, about whose finances he knows nothing, may actually benefit from it.  A relativist fairgoer might say that since a Ferris-wheel appears dangerous to him, it must therefore actually be a material threat to life and limb.  Yet his understanding of the physics of Ferris-wheels, or the modern materials used in their construction, or the safety ordinances governing amusement rides, or the fact that the Ferris-wheel in question has just been thoroughly rebuilt and inspected, may be partly or entirely incomplete or just plain false, and so his report that the Ferris-wheel is unsafe may be precisely counter to fact.   
  
  And so far these examples might be attributed to mere idiocy on the parts of the politician and the fairgoer, and easily dealt with or overlooked; but consider how such an uninformed concept of reality can affect one’s whole lookout on the rest of life.  For example, a certain butcher might perceive that his shop is being boycotted by ethnic Semetarians.  He has not seen a Semetarian come in for five or six days, and whenever he rings up some of his regular and satisfied customers who are Semetarians he gets their answering machines.  What this butcher may not know– perhaps because he never bothered to think about it– is that this week is a Semetarian religious observance, and there may be mores for Semetarians about fasting and attendance at prayer services, for the term of the holy week but not beyond.  But based on what he perceives, he concludes that Semetarians no longer wish to buy meats from him; and since it seems that only Semetarians are doing this he forms an opinion about the Semetarians’ buying habits and how they feel about non-Semetarian butchers.  His resentment towards Semetarians appears justified to him based on what he perceives where he is at the time. In other words, his personal perception, not his logical reasoning, determines his working concept of reality.
  
  The reality this butcher does not recognise, but easily could, is that his conclusions came from incomplete or even invalid information.  He may never consider that his competitors are also missing their regular Semetarian customers.  It may be that the Semetarians will return after their fast and buy twice as much meat as on other weeks.  Others might have come through the shop this week and just not mentioned to him that they were Semetarian.  But if this butcher is unwilling to grasp a reality that transcends any one butchery in town, any one week in time, or any one group of people, his immediate, relevant, and personal perception may fix for him that the Semetarians are deliberately choosing to avoid his shop in particular.  Not understanding why, nor even comprehending that there may be a reason which has nothing to do with any subjective assessment of him or his shop, his reliance on personal perception alone can lead to an irrational resentment which could of course grow into something more socially reprehensible– and perhaps bad for his business, which would only exacerbate his resentment. 
   
  Of course it is entirely possible to prolong such a debate over perceived reality and absolute truth to the point where the minutest points about the concepts are bandied back and forth ad nauseum.  The focussed, most applicable reality is that thinking Man must accept that he might not have complete awareness of all realities affecting his existence at all times.  Rather than to accept as truth only what he can perceive and to act upon that assumption– for I cannot refer to it in any better terms– it is his duty to seek more data, especially that which his personal judgements may deem distasteful or disconcerting, before deciding what is and is not reality in the given case.  In the absence or unavailability of such definitive data, his only logical recourse is to accept that he simply cannot know for sure, no matter how discomforting that may be for him to admit.  It is when a man allows his own comfort, whether physical or intellectual, to shield him from acceptance of true reality that he casts off the one divinely-granted attribute that makes him Man in the first place.  Without the deliberate exercise of that marvellous Reason in situations that call for it, he is no better than a brute. 
   
  The secondary ignorance that results from modern Man’s utter dependence on his own personal perception would have irritated and incensed Descartes himself. To show even the barest modicum of respect to his idea, the least we can do is to stop misunderstanding or at least misapplying him– for our insistence that we understand only proclaims to the better enlightened that we certainly do not understand after all. As a certain more famous absolutist has said, 
   
  ‘If ye were blind, ye should have no sin: but that ye say, ‘‘We see”, therefore your sin remaineth.’ John 9: 41
  
  
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My school of philosophy.

Jonnie Comet
2 May 1996

  The study of philosophy is the asking of questions.  Inherent in that is the element of cynicism: it seems that every philosopher inevitably disputes something the rest of society takes for granted.  In his search for ultimate truth he asks, as did Pilate, ‘What is truth?’ [i] and then invariably concludes that no such thing exists.  Fielding contrasts seekers of philosophical truth and seekers of gold:

  ‘[Y]et surely, there can be no comparison between the two; for who ever heard of a gold-finder that had the impudence or folly to assert, from the ill success of his search, that there was no such thing as gold in the world?’ [ii]

   So it will hold for all seekers of truth who initiate their search with skepticism, for as the scientific model tells us, he who enters a scientific study suspecting a specific outcome will surely arrive at precisely that outcome.  The atheist mathematician Bertrand Russell would have done well to heed the prime maxim of his field before declaring that there is no God. [iii]
  Philosophers are therefore very idiosyncratic.  Perhaps there is no recognising the ultimate truth, since every being is biased in his way of thinking, and will, understandably, seek to justify his own point of view.  I will grant readily that I am biased against those who challenge the establishment for the sake of challenge alone, but am just as biased against those who champion it for the sake of championing alone.  I have traditionally called myself a pragmatist, but my definition of Pragmatism will not correlate with that of the studied texts.  For example, I strongly maintain the concept that ethical absolutes do exist in this world and that we are either fools to deny them or fools to accept them blindly.  But like Fielding’s gold-digger, we would be most foolish to assume that, because we do not see them right in front of our faces, they do not exist anywhere.
  I suppose I am mainly an idealist, but I have been this way for so long that I long outgrew the need to place myself in some simplistic category.  I will state unequivocally that it is the responsibility of the teacher to exemplify ethical ideals in thought, word, and deed for the benefit of all young people.  Kant states that ‘the child must learn to act according to “maxims”’, [iv] and insists the teacher’s job is to prescribe such maxims in terms even small children can understand.  I absolutely agree that children need strict moral guidance, but I also hold with Rousseau in that there may well be an inherent goodness in human beings.  The truth most likely lies in Alexander Pope’s succinct assessment, that man is a ‘Chaos of Thought and Passion’, [v]  both logical reasoning and illogical feeling rolled into one.  The wise teacher understands and accepts this.
  Kant’s remarkable argument, two hundred years before Skinner, [vi] convincingly makes the point that manipulation of behaviour and consequences is not a desirable method of developing a child’s ability to make ethical decisions:

  ‘If you punish a child for being naughty, and reward him for being good, he will do right merely for the sake of the rewards; and when he goes out into the world and finds that goodness is not always rewarded, nor wickedness punished, he will grow into a man who… does right or wrong according as he finds either of advantage to himself’. [vii]

  This is the frame of mind of the destitute urban American minority to whom, sadly, so much immoral inclination may be rightly attributed, because he recognises no relationship between the ideal of doing good and the reality of his personal situation.  In the liberal American ‘politically-correct’ Naturalism of the 1990s he is justified in his behaviour and considered a victim of unnamed, unattributable circumstances.  As this mindset becomes increasingly prevalent among children of means, all society slides into the gutter (vis., why do even rich kids wear the baggy trousers of homeless refugees?), and soon develops into an anarchy of isolated individuals all fearful or hateful of others around them.
  The only just course for a pedagogue is to deliberately embody a positive moral stance, championing the set of values proven over all time to be the best for all mankind.  Yes; I know what that means; it is an idealistic crusade towards some Utopian concept of ‘Good’ that may never be fully defined or accepted.  But the striving towards Good is the stuff of which greatness is made, and if a teacher is ever to do anything, it is to attempt to effect the improvement of his charges.  Jefferson, Douglass, Gandhi, King, and Mandela all advocated a society in which the true worth of a man is measured not by his appearance, or birthright, or ability to amass material treasure, but by the goodness of his character.  Or, as I so often quote Richardson’s valiant young maiden, ‘Virtue is the only nobility.’ [viii]  That, as succinctly as it can be put, is my philosophy.


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[i]  What is ‘truth’?  - John 18.38
[ii] [Y]et surely... world?  - Fielding; Tom Jones:  bk. 6, ch. 1
[iii]    The atheist... God  - Not the first time I have found fault with Russell! –JC
[iv]     the child... ‘maxims’  - Kant; Education; Charton, Annette, translator.  Excerpted in Philosophical Foundations of Education.  Eds. Howard Ozmon, Samuel Craver
[v] Chaos of Thought and Passion  - Pope; An Essay on Man: e. 2; l. 13
[vi]    Skinner  - Psychologist B.F. Skinner (1899-1990) pioneered the concept that behaviour can be conditioned through manipulation of stimuli and consequences.  Prominent in Skinnerian theory is the idea that man is subservient to stimuli which cause him to act in the exhibited fashion, as if he possesses no will to alter his behaviour on his own –JC
[vii]   If you... himself  - Kant, in Ozman & Craver text, pp. 33-34
[viii]  Virtue is the only nobility  - Richardson, Samuel; Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded: letter 23).  Apparently Pamela (at 15) has read Juvenal’s Tenth Satire; but then, her father was an Anglican priest and probably possessed of a good library. –JC

Does Thomas Aquinas adequately prove the existence of God?

Doubting Thomas, and ye of little faith.



Jonnie Comet
December 1993



  At that time, Jesus said to his disciple Thomas, ‘Blessed are those who have not seen, and yet have believed.’ [i]  

  Thomas had insisted on seeing, feeling, and hearing proof of His continued existence. It was not enough for him to rely on his own faith when he heard from his closest and most beloved friends the acts and words of the One among them who would never have deceived anyone.  He needed empirical evidence from his own eyes and ears and hands.
  So it might have seemed with his namesake, Thomas Aquinas.  Considered by many to have established the basic theological precepts of the Catholic faith, Aquinas apparently found himself surrounded by enough non-believers that he felt compelled to take on his futile philosophical exercise.  Yet among thinking minds, I imagine the born atheist is probably more willing to accept at least the possibility than is the consciously converted unbeliever.  Using empirical data to explain the existence of God to one resolutely against the idea is like describing the concept of colour to one who has never seen.
  The underlying issue here is faith.  Faith, like true love, is blind.  Faith does not ask for proof, does not require confirmation through empirical observation.  Faith is pure, undefiled, perfect acceptance.  No, this is not a rational concept, and no cold, hard, detached scientific inquisition can diminish its worth.  Yet faith itself is crucial to continued existence in society.  For I say to you: there will never be a time when organised faith in a predominant deity will not, even in the least, hold sway over a significant proportion of the world population.
  One cannot doubt that St Thomas Aquinas believes in the existence of the benevolent God of his faith.  But does he adequately prove His existence to the non-believers?  That is a question only former non-believers can answer.  The true believer does not require proof, least of all from the empirical observations of someone else. Aquinas’ allusion to Aristotle’s ‘first mover’ principle is commendable, for it is on this point that every atheist’s argument breaks down, and that gives any argument I might wage for the existence of God that much more intellectual ammunition.  But is this argument so intellectual that I should need it?  And with whom would I presume to wage such a pointless argument?
  For all those who believe in a benevolent deity, I give you the Hindu mystic Ramakrishna’s lovely invitation, that all who worship do so with each other’s blessing, no matter what form that worship may take.  As for those who do not believe, I give you God’s admonition to those who first thought to doubt His generosity and authority:

  ‘Remember, O Man, that thou art but dust, and unto dust shalt thou return.’ [ii]

  You have nothing to lose but your salvation.



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[i]   Jesus said... believed  - John 20.29
[ii]Remember, O Man...  return’  - Genesis 3.19